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INTRODUCTION

"Privatization" means increased governmental reliance on the
private sector, rather than on government agencies, to satisfy the
needs of society. Since the word was first used in 1969,' privatization has gained broad recognition and widespread acceptance, and,
in recent years, a major trend toward privatization has developed
in the United States and abroad. The reasons for this trend are
both pragmatic and ideological. Pragmatists advocate privatization
because it offers a more efficient way to provide goods and services.
Ideological opponents of big government support privatization because it reduces the role of government. Privatization is therefore
an important movement in East and West, in developing and developed countries, in communist and capitalist nations. It has
taken root even in China and the Soviet Union.
Privatization in the United States has taken a different form
than it has in other countries. Outside the United States, in both
developing and developed countries, the principal form of privatization is denationalization-the divestment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In the United States, which has relatively few
SOEs, state and local governments are implementing privatization
*

Adapted from E. SAVAS,

PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY To BETTEr GOVERNMENT

(1987).

** Professor and Chairman, Management Department, School of Business and Public

Administration, Baruch College, City University of New York.
1. The earliest use of the term appears to have been in P. DRUCKER, THE AGE OF DIsCONTINUITY (1969) (using the term "reprivatization").
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primarily through contracting and, to a lesser degree, vouchers,
franchises, free-market arrangements, and voluntary efforts. 2 Contracting, however, is the primary method governments use to
privatize prisons.3

II. THE

CURRENT STATE OF PRIVATIZATION IN GENERAL

A.

Extent of Contractingfor Services

The results of a 1982 survey, summarized in Table 1, reveal
the extent to which local governments have contracted with private sources for the provision of local government services. On average each jurisdiction surveyed contracted out, in whole or in
part, twenty-seven percent of the fifty-nine services examined in
the survey. Information concerning the contracting out of emergency medical care, ambulance service, day-care facility operation,
programs for children and the elderly, operation and management
of hospitals and mental health facilities, and operation of drug and
alcohol treatment programs is especially relevant to a discussion of
prison contracting. One-quarter to one-half of the jurisdictions surveyed contract with, and rely on, private profit or nonprofit organizations to supply each of these vital services. These services, which
primarily are concerned with vulnerable or partially incapacitated
segments of the population, have exhibited the greatest growth
rate for privatization by contracting. 4 Government reliance upon
private organizations in these areas is significant because prisoners
also can be described as a vulnerable and incapacitated segment of
the population. Other privatization arrangements relevant to a discussion of prison contracting involve the development of private
police protection, alternative dispute resolution, and legal aid.

2.

E. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION:

THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT

ch. 4 (1987).

3. Under this approach, government agencies contract with and pay private firms to
operate prisons or to provide some of the functional services in prisons.
4. By 1979 government agencies were purchasing 55% of the dollar value of social
services from private organizations. Knowledgeable authorities considered this to be the

fastest growing area. See H. HATRY & E. DURMAN,
SOCIAL

SERVICES

ISSUES IN COMPETITIVE CONTRACTING FOR

(National Institute of Governmental Purchasing 1985).
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Table 1.1
Service
Public works
and
transportation
18 services,
average
Public safety
Crime
prevention/
patrol
Police/fire
communication
Fire prevention/
suppression
Emergency
medical service
Ambulance
service
Traffic control/
parking
enforcement
Vehicle towing
and storage
Average
Health and
Human
Services
Sanitary
inspection
Insect/rodent
control
Animal control
Animal shelter
operation
Day-care facility
operation
Child welfare
programs
Programs for
elderly
Operation/
management of
public/elderly
housing
Operation/
management of
hospitals

Number of
governments
reporting

Percentage
Contracting With:
Profit

Percentage
Contracting With:
Nonprofit

1121

21

3

1660

3

7

1684

1

3

1516

1

4

1333

14

11

1214

25

11

1505

1

1

1285
1457

80
18

0
5

939

1

6

1037
1482

14
6

5
9

1225

13

19

436

35

43

558

5

26

1189

4

33

602

13

19

361

30

28

5. Table 1 is based on a survey of 1780 county and local governments. See C.
& L

MANCHESTER,

PROACHES,

RETHINKING

LOCAL SERVICES: EXAMINING

ALTERNATIVE

Table B (Management Information Service Special Report 1984).

VALENTE
AP-

DELIVERY
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Public health
programs
Drug/alcohol
treatment
programs
Operation of
mental health/
retardation
programs/
facilities
Average
Parks and
recreation
7 services,
average
Support
functions
15 services,
average

Grand average

[Vol. 40:889

721

8

29

626

6

45

512
807

7
12

43
25

1050

5

19

1511

18

2

17

10

Individuals, businesses, neighborhood associations, or governments may purchase private police services." In fact, the number of
guards in the private security industry far exceeds the number of
public law-enforcement officers.7 In 1980 expenditures for private
security guards in the United States totalled 21.7 billion dollars, as
compared to the 13.8 billion dollars expended for public police
forces.8 Private police provide a large portion of guard services for
federal government facilities, 9 conduct passenger and baggage
screening at airports, protect stores against shoplifters, and provide security in banks and hotels, often working in close cooperation with local police departments. 10
Using private sources for the provision of certain judicial functions is another example of the application of the privatization
concept. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR), colloquially known
as "rent-a-judge," refers to arbitration services available from private sources. Disputants engage such services because they usually
are speedier, more convenient, and more economical than traditional civil court proceedings. ADR is less expensive than civil
court proceedings because fewer hours of costly legal work are
6. Table 1 lists only government contracts with private guard services.
7. The private security industry employs 680,000 guards while public law enforcement
officers number only 580,000. See Cunningham & Taylor, The Hallcrest Report: Private
Security and Police in America, in CRIME AND PROTECTION INAMERICA (D. Ford ed. 1985).
8. Id.
9. Peyton, Standards for Public Building Maintenance, 44 APWA Rep., Oct. 1977, at
28-29.
10. See Stewart, Public Safety and Private Policy, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 758-65 (1985).
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needed. It is more economical because the cost of litigation in civil
courts often exceeds the damages recovered."
A form of privatization similar to ADR is developing to help
resolve certain private disputes that result in misdemeanors.
Courts refer these cases to neighborhood justice centers and community dispute resolution committees. The disputes range from
squabbles about loose dogs and loud radios to assault and battery
and petty theft between neighbors. The mediators, who usually are
trained lay persons, hold prompt, informal, and confidential hearings through which they attempt to determine the underlying
12
causes of the disputes.

Commentators have criticized these dispute resolution programs because they believe that the programs create a second-class
justice system for the poor."3 For example, should judges assign
cases of domestic violence to neighborhood justice centers for resolution instead of criminal courts? Although privatized justice for
civil cases is both plausible and sensible, the use of privatized justice in criminal cases presents a more difficult question.
In addition to private police protection, ADR, and neighborhood justice centers, various state and local governments have contracted with the private sector to provide legal services for indigent
criminal defendants. Such privatized legal aid is an alternative to
the in-house government services of a public defender. The two
systems have not been subjected to thorough comparative analysis,
but privatized legal aid compares favorably with the services of
14
privately retained lawyers

B. Attitudes and Evidence on Privatization
Public officials who have contracted with private sources for
local governmental services generally have been satisfied with the
results of their privatization experiment. Table 2 summarizes the
results of a nationwide survey of municipal and county officials
11. The media and civil liberties groups have criticized ADR because the proceedings
are closed to the public. But does the public have a right to watch people fight? Must all
disagreements be exposed to public view by a prurient press? Why not complain that when
a court case is resolved before trial (the vast majority of all cases), the public also is deprived of its gladiator spectacles?
12. See Tolchin, When the Justice System is Put Under Contract, N.Y. Times, Aug.
4, 1985, § 6, at 4, col. 4. For example, the Neighborhood Justice Center in Atlanta handled
2400 cases in 1984, 56% of which were criminal. See id.
13. Id.

14.

R. HERMAN, E. SINGLE & J. BOSTON,

URBAN AMERICA

(1977).

COUNSEL FOR THE PooR CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN
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who have contracted out local government services. The officials'
responses to the survey presumably reflect their experiences with
the various contract services listed in Table 1.
Table 2.'5
Costs less
Costs same
Costs more
Better service
Same service
Worse service

Small Jurisdictions
40 %
19
34
63
14
22

Large Jurisdictions
41 %
22
10
33
48
15

Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results of a larger survey conducted in New Jersey." The results of this survey indicate that the
public officials surveyed were highly satisfied with contract services. Cost savings, in-house limitations, and better management
are the dominant reasons why public officials contract for services.
The in-house limitations that influence a public official's decision
to contract with private sources include the need for large capital
investments and the lack of facilities.17 These factors are particularly important in a public official's decision to contract out prison
construction, operation, and management."8
Table 3.19
Service Area

Very
Somewhat
No
satisfied satisfied Dissatisfied Opinion

N

A. Municipal Officials
Public works

58 %

29 %

Public safety

72

22

6

0

Social services
Total

74
61 %

26
28 %

0
8 %

0
2 %

10 %

3 %

149
18

23
190

15. The small jurisdiction category covers municipalities with populations under
50,000; the sample size is 89. See Florestano & Gordon, Public vs. Private: Small Government Contractingwith the Private Sector, 40 PuB. ADMIN. REV., Jan./Feb. 1980, at 29-34.
The large jurisdiction category covers 14 municipalities and 14 counties with populations
greater than 500,000. See Florestano & Gordon, Private Provision of Public Services: Contracting by Large Local Governments, 1 INT'L J. PUB.ADMIN. 307, 307-27 (1979).
16. The stratified random samples employed iri
this study are representative of all the
municipalities and counties in the state.
17. See infra note 20 and accompanying Table 4.
18. See infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
19. "N" is the number of officials responding. Table 3 is derived from EAGLETON INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, ALTERNATIVE METHODS FOR DELIVERING PUBLIC SERVICES IN NEW JERSEY

26-29 (1986) (prepared for the State and Local Expenditure and Revenue Policy
Commission).
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B. County Officials

68 %

25 %

7 %

0 %

57

Other

N

Table 4.2
Cost
In-house
Better
savings limitations management

Service Area
A. Municipal Officials
Public works
Pubic safety
Social services
Total

43 %
53
20
41 %

31 %
21
36
30 %

4 %
5
20
6 %

22 %
21
24
23 %

134
19
25
178

B. County Officials

36 'e

30 %

7 %

27 %

56

The evidence provided by numerous studies comparing the efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and quality of contract and in-house
services indicates that the positive attitude exhibited by public officials toward contracting is justified. 21 The results of these studies
suggest that direct provision of a service by a government agency
generally costs one-third to one-half more than the price charged
22
by a private contractor to do work of equal quality.
III.

PRIVATIZATION OF PRISONS

23

When first proposed, privatization of the prison industry
seemed a dramatic and thought-provoking concept. In retrospect,
however, it was a natural and inevitable development. While the
demand for criminal incarceration is growing, the supply of prison
space is not keeping pace.24 Prison overcrowding demonstrates the
need for new facilities, but the cost of prison construction and operation is high. Although the public demands that criminals be incarcerated, the public refuses to pay the price for such services.
Privatization of prisons, therefore, represents an influx of new suppliers who are attempting to satisfy these needs, and earn profits
25
in the process.

20. "N" is the number of officials responding. "In-house limitations" refers to high
start-up costs, large capital investment, or lack of physical facilities, manpower, or expertise.
"Other" includes convenience, legal mandates, and better service delivery. Id.
21. Generally speaking, the most authoritative studies involved quantifiable "hard services" (e.g., public works, commercial, and transportation services) rather than less quantifiable "soft" services (e.g., human and social services). See E. SAVAS, supra note 2, at chs. 6 &
7.
22. Id.
23. Id. at ch. 7.
24. See Logan & Rausch, Punish and Profit: The Emergence of Private Enterprise
Prisons, 2 JUST. Q. 303, 303-18 (1985). Logan and Rausch estimate that by 1983 state and
federal prisons were at 110% of their capacity.
25. See Mullen, Corrections and the Private Sector, 65 PRISON J., Autumn-Winter

896

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:889

The private sector can perform several distinct functions with
respect to prisons: (1) finance and construct prisons; (2) operate
facilities for juveniles; (3) operate facilities for adults; (4) provide
work for prisoners; and (5) provide specific contractual services to
prisons, for example, health care and vocational education for the
inmates and training for the staff. Public interest focuses on the
role of private firms in the first three of these areas, the construction and operation of various types of correctional facilities. Private organizations, particularly not-for-profit ones, have operated
halfway houses for criminal offenders for many years. Now, however, they also operate detention facilities. 26 Private, for-profit
firms are planning maximum-security prisons. In 1985 private
firms were building or operating some two dozen adult prisons,
most of them for illegal aliens and protective-custody prisoners. 28
Interest in prison privatization stems from the perception that
private prisons are more cost effective and efficient, constructed
more quickly, and operated under more flexible and innovative
management. Although public costs are said to be twenty to forty
percent greater than private costs, the evidence is not yet persuasive because public costs omit various factors and private costs
may or may not cover the construction costs of new facilities. 29 A
definitive study of the relative costs of private and public prison
service provision cannot be completed until more private prisons
are operating and uniform cost frameworks are established.
The private-sector advantage in speed and flexibility of construction has merit. State governments find private financing and
construction attractive, in part because it permits them to evade
voter approval of bond issues. Typically, the state does not have to
raise the capital to build the prison. The private sector builds the
prison with private financing and operates it. The state then makes
annual payments to the private owner under a lease-purchase contract."0 Although the validity of this arrangement has been questioned because it bypasses express voter approval, it saves time
and money for state governments.
1985, at 1.
26. Logan & Rausch, supra note 24.
27. Id.
28. Telephone Interview with Charles H. Logan, Professor, University of Connecticut
(Jan. 14, 1986).
29. Logan & Rausch, supra note 24, at 310.
30. See id. at 313-16 (presenting several illustrations of the speed and flexibility with
which private firms respond to government requests for additional prison space).
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Private companies already provide extensive contract services
in existing prisons. Sixty-six correctional agencies in thirty-nine
states plus the District of Columbia spent about 200 million dollars
in 1983 on 3215 contracts with private firms for thirty-two different services and programs." These services consisted mostly of
health and mental-health care, drug treatment, counseling, education, vocational training, college programs, and staff training. The
agencies reported that contract services were more cost effective
than those that the agency could provide, that advantages outweighed disadvantages, and that most of the agencies planned to
expand their use of contracts for specific services.32
IV. RESPONSES TO ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRISON PRIVATIZATION
Despite the widespread and long-standing use of contractors
to provide some prison services, civil libertarians and correction officers and officials have expressed concern about the possibility
that private, for-profit firms would own or operate prisons. The issues raised by these concerned individuals include basic constitutional questions concerning a private individual's right to deprive
others of their freedom. Advocates of privatization respond that
although only the state has the right to imprison one of its citizens,
it surely is not the only entity that can run a prison in a fair, humane, and efficient manner.
Present prison conditions make it difficult, if not impossible,
to argue that governments, rather than private firms, should operate prisons because the latter would tolerate poor conditions in
their pursuit of profits. In 1986 thirty-three states and numerous
localities were under federal court orders to correct the miserable,
overcrowded conditions in their prisons.3 3 In 1984 the 382,000 inmates in the Nation's 694 state prisons occupied an average of 57
square feet of housing space-li percent less than in 1 9 7 9.a4 Fur31. Camp & Camp, CorrectionalPrivatization in Perspective, 65 PRISON J., AutumnWinter 1985, at 14.
32. Id. at 19-21.
33. See Inside America's Toughtest Prisons,NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 1986, at 46. Indeed, a
court may be better able to enforce its orders on a private firm than on an agency in another
branch of government. See Applebome, Texas Held in Contempt of Court Over Prisons,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1987, at 14, col 1. Moreover, one-third of the nation's 3500 city and
county jails recently have been involved in class action lawsuits brought by inmates who
allege that inadequate medical care caused serious injuries and death. See Steptoe, Inmates
Claim Prisons Are Failing to Provide Adequate Medical Care, Wall St. J., May 15, 1986, at
1, col 1.
34. Study Finds Prison Space Cut, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1986, at 29, col 1.
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thermore, the record of for-profit hospitals demonstrates that a
private organization's quest for profits does not lead necessarily to
poor services: the quality of medical care provided by for-profit
35
hospitals is equal to that provided by nonprofit hospitals.
Contracts for private prisons must specify standards for inmate care and staff training, guarantees of constitutional treatment, and guidelines for discipline and the use of force. These
standards, guarantees, and guidelines, however, are also necessary
in public prisons. If government prison contracts carefully and
clearly allocate authority and liability between public and private
agents, problems can be minimized.
In addition to the above concerns, some opponents of prison
privatization argue that it is immoral to profit from the imprisonment of others. Privatizing prisons, however, is no more immoral
than paying police officers to capture criminals or physicians to
save lives. The justice system itself is already a source of profit for
numerous professions. The fact that an activity is vital to human
welfare is no reason to isolate it from competition and profit. If
this were true, government agencies would be the exclusive provid36
ers of food, clothing, medical care, transportation, and housing.
Some opponents of privatization further claim that private
prison firms will be inclined to lobby for more and longer prison
sentences and less use of probation, parole, and halfway houses. If
this argument was sound, however, prison officials, guards, and
their unions presumably would act in the same manner for the
same reasons. This, however, is not the case. Even if private
prison firms did lobby for these policies such lobbying may demonstrate responsiveness to the public's demand for longer sentences.
Moreover, although such lobbying may result in increased spending on private prison projects, it could also result in the improvement of prison conditions.
Private prisons may be able to make a truly significant contribution in the area of prisoner work programs by creating factories
with fences instead of warehouses with walls, in the words of former Chief Justice Warren E. Burger. Of course, governments must
not create a modern replica of the old system under which states
leased prisoners to farms where prisoners worked for substandard
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, FOR-PROFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE (1986).
36. D. BAST, IN DEFENSE OF PRIVATE PRISONS (Heartland Institute ed. Mar. 4, 1986).
37. Moreover, one can look by analogy at day-care centers: Private contractors in that
business are not notably active in encouraging higher birthrates and opposing birth control
and abortion.

35.
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wages.
Proponents of prison privatization must oveicome legislative
and political barriers, as well as union opposition, to private prisons and prison work. The need to define clearly the respective
roles of the public agency and the contractor, to develop quality
standards, and to monitor the performance of the contracted work
is critical to the privatization effort. Governments can monitor private prison operations through a gamut of activities, including examining the contractor's records, conducting on-site inspections,
and using temporarily imprisoned undercover agents and sophisticated inmate opinion surveys.3 8
V.

CONCLUSION

The unsatisfactory state of America's penal system and the
high recidivism rate warrant experimenting with alternative approaches to inmate care and encouraging a much more substantive
role for the private sector. Prison privatization will no doubt raise
problems. Many issues, including those identified above, will have
to be addressed. Nevertheless, the expected innovations from a private prison industry and the introduction of competition as an antidote to government monopoly hold the promise of great improvement in our prison system and the challenge of learning from new
experiences.

38. Recidivists who have been imprisoned elsewhere might be particularly in demand
as interview subjects because they offer the perspective of a comparison shopper! See, e.g.,
Press, "A Person, Not a Number," NEWSWEEK, June 29, 1987, at 63.

